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Abstract
Complex systems show the capacity to aggregate information and to display coordinated
activity. In the case of social systems the interaction of different individuals leads to the
emergence of norms, trends in political positions, opinions, cultural traits, and even scientific
progress. Examples of collective behavior can be observed in activities like the Wikipedia
and Linux, where individuals aggregate their knowledge for the benefit of the community,
and citizen science, where the potential of collectives to solve complex problems is
exploited. Here, we conducted an online experiment to investigate the performance of a col-
lective when solving a guessing problem in which each actor is endowed with partial infor-
mation and placed as the nodes of an interaction network. We measure the performance of
the collective in terms of the temporal evolution of the accuracy, finding no statistical differ-
ence in the performance for two classes of networks, regular lattices and random networks.
We also determine that a Bayesian description captures the behavior pattern the individuals
follow in aggregating information from neighbors to make decisions. In comparison with
other simple decision models, the strategy followed by the players reveals a suboptimal per-
formance of the collective. Our contribution provides the basis for the micro-macro connec-
tion between individual based descriptions and collective phenomena.
Introduction
Decision making nowadays is a topic of growing interest from the scientific community and
the industry. This is because, it can provide statistical predictions of animal and human behav-
ior [1–6]. The effects of social influence and collaboration on the collective outcome have been
addressed from different perspectives, both theoretical and experimental [7–11]. In complex
problem solving, crowd-sourced collaboration has proved to be beneficial by shortening sub-
stantially the time to find a solution. Examples of these collaborative initiatives include prob-
lem solving in mathematics [12], software design [13], and data analysis [14].
In the study of cooperation, network reciprocity is an important mechanism [15, 16]. Theo-
retical works have shown that the role of network connectivity on cooperation depends on the
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evaluation of the individuals payoffs that can have a positive effect [17, 18], however, coopera-
tion can be diminished when the real connection cost is taken into account [19]. Experimental
work in the Prisoner’s dilemma game shows that heterogeneous networks do not enhance
cooperation [20]. However, a dynamic interaction network can promote cooperation [21, 22].
Other works have also addressed how individuals learn and how the interaction network can
influence the dissemination of useful information, individual choices, and the social outcomes
[23, 24]. The performance of groups when compared with the performance of individual
experts is reflected in The Wisdom of Crowds effect [25, 26] which suggests that the aggrega-
tion of independent decisions often outperforms individual experts. However, social influence
can have a diminishing effect over this phenomenon [27].
To investigate how network structure affects social information use, decision making and
decision accuracy, we performed an experiment with neutral items where individuals have to
assemble information from peers according to an interaction network. Players have to make
decisions based on incomplete and uncertain information, which allow us to address the pro-
cess of aggregation of information and assess the decision making capacities of the players.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of the Balearic Islands. Online
informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to participation in the experiment.
Experimental Design
We developed a social experiment consisting of an online game in which players have to guess
a sequence of colors using information of an incomplete sequence provided initially to them
and from the proposals of their neighbors. The experiment was structured in sessions each con-
sisting of a set of N individuals assigned randomly to the nodes of a network as sketched in
Fig 1. The target color code was composed of a sequence of li positions (i = 1, . . ., 10) colored
with color c(i) from the available set (red, blue, and yellow). We defined xj(li, t) as the color
chosen by player j for the position li at time t.
We conducted a series of online sessions on different dates. The first one took place on May
7th, 2014 at 12:30 GMT+1 (Experiment 1) with 20 participants and a second experiment was
conducted 3 weeks later on May 28th, 2014 at 11:30 GMT+1 (Experiment 2) with 17 partici-
pants. Both experiments were announced through a mailing list, and the players’ participation
was voluntary and anonymous. Prior to the start of the experiment, the participants were
required to agree on the Terms and Conditions and they were invited to answer a survey pro-
viding basic demographic data. The participants, 74% males and 26% females, reported an
average age of 33.6 ± 7.3 years.
Each experiment consisted of six consecutive games being the first game intended to famil-
iarize the participant with the interface and the purpose of the last game to evaluate the adapta-
tion process of the players. The first and the last games were played against automata. In the
remaining games, the participants interacted with other participants. Players were not informed
whether they played with automata or with human players. An itemized list of instructions was
provided at the beginning of each experiment. During the game, the participants also had access
to a summary of the main instructions available on the screen (see S1 Text for a description of
the instructions provided). No economical incentive was offered to the participants.
In each game, players had to guess a color code of ten positions. Each position could be col-
ored with one of the following colors: red, blue, or yellow. Participants had 225 seconds to
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guess the code after initial access to a partial sequence of the code. An example as well as the
proposed codes of the neighboring players is shown in Fig 2A.
At the beginning of the game, only three out of the ten positions of the common target color
code were shown to the players. The positions shown were generated at random covering the
full code and they were randomly assigned to the players. After seeing the initial partial code,
the players faced an empty code (green boxes with question marks) that they had to fill with
their proposals. When the cursor was placed over one of the positions, a list of available colors
was displayed on top of it (see Fig 2B). To avoid any bias towards any particular color, the
order of the list of available colors presented to each player was randomly generated. When a
player choses one of the colors in the list, the position is colored accordingly. Once the player
fillS the entire color code, the update button is activated to submit and share the proposed
color code. The player could then see the proposals of the neighbors only after the completion
of the first guess.
Each player was initially randomly assigned to a node in the network and was limited to
share her proposals only with the neighbors. Consequently, players only saw the proposals of
their neighbors. Fig 2C shows the game interface after the first proposal of the focal player now
including the proposals of the neighbors. The visualization interface limits the size of the neigh-
borhood, and, to simplify the analysis, we considered networks where each node had the same
number of neighbors. In particular we used a regular lattice and a degree regular random net-
work as they show differentiated topological properties, for instance, with respect to the aver-
age path length. In order to avoid the effect of learning, if any, the topological arrangement of
the networks in Experiment 1 was random, regular, regular, and random, while in Experiment
2 it was permuted to regular, random, random, and regular. In all network configurations, the
node degree was set to k = 4.
At the end of each game, the players were rewarded with 10 points for finishing the game,
and 100 points per correct position. A bonus of 1000 points was granted to the players guessing
Fig 1. Illustration of the network configurations. Focal player (red node) is connected to k = 4 neighbors (blue nodes) having access to their proposals,
and, at the same time, she shares her proposals with them. The remaining nodes and network connections are depicted by the green nodes and the gray
links, respectively. Random network is represented on the left and regular network on the right.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153586.g001
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the correct code. Before starting a new game, a ranking of the players was shown. This was
shown as an incentive to the players although but it was not used in the analysis. A movie with
the dynamics of one of the games can be found in the Supporting Information (S1 Video).
Results
The activity during the game is measured by the number of complete color codes submitted by
the players. Fig 3 shows how the activity of the players during the games fluctuates around an
average activity of 10 proposals every 5 seconds. The complementary cumulative distribution
of inter-proposal time, that is, the time between two consecutive proposals for the same indi-
vidual, reveals an exponential decay of the individuals’ activity with a characteristic time of
28 ± 3 s after Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) [28].
In all the games, as the time increases, the participants tend toward the proposed color code.
The hamming distance, defined as the number of differing positions between two color codes,
averaged over all pairs of players at the end of each game lies in the range (2.1, 3.3). The perfor-
mance of the collective is measured by the temporal evolution of the accuracy averaged over
Fig 2. Interactive interface of the game. (A) Example of the partial target code shown initially to the player
displaying positions 3, 5 and 10 with the correct color, while the other positions are empty. Green boxes with
question marks are the remaining positions of the code to be guessed by the player (green color is not used in
the color code sequence). (B) Interface for the first guess. When the mouse cursor is placed over a question
mark green box, a list of available colors present in the code is shown. (C) Player interface during the game.
At the top of the screen the proposals from neighboring players (Team) are shown. When a member of the
Team updates her code, a flashing ‘new code’ bubble is shown on the icon of the updater.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153586.g002
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the total number of players, that is, pðtÞ ¼ 1
N
P
j
P
idxjðli ;tÞ;cðiÞ, where δa, b is the Kronecker’s delta.
Fig 4A shows p(t) as well as the individual distributions for the two networks considered in the
experiment. The average performance of the group at the end of the games with the same inter-
action network is p = 8.3. The unpaired Mann-Whitney U test and the paired Wilcoxon signed
rank test, computed for the distributions of p(t) values at each time step of 1 s indicate the
absence of any statistical difference between the distributions of p(t) in the two networks (aver-
age p-values> 0.4, see S1 Fig).
The propagation of information is investigated by measuring the relationship between the
probability of providing a correct answer and the distance to the closest source. For a position,
a node is a source if the position corresponds to one of the entries provided initially to the
player in that node. The positions shown initially are correctly assigned 95% of the times by the
players and practically remain unchanged during the game, with only 26 changes for these
positions out of the 1491 proposals. For each player and each unknown position li, we compute
Fig 3. Activity of the players during the games. Main figure: complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) of the inter-proposal times (bin size: 1
s). Dashed line shows an exponential fit (MLE) to the data f(t) = exp(−bt) with b = 0.036 s−1. Inset: Temporal distribution of the number of proposals across
the games aggregated in bins of 5 s. Dotted line shows the averaged activity of 10 proposals every 5 seconds.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153586.g003
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Fig 4. Group performance: temporal evolution of the accuracy. (A) Average number of correct positions
for aggregated data of the games with the same interaction topology (solid thick lines, red random networks;
blue: regular lattice). The number of correct positions of the individual players is also shown (dimmed
symbols). For visualization purposes a slight vertical displacement has been applied. (B) Ratio between the
probabilities of correct positions at distances d1 = 1 and d2 = 2 from the closest source. Inset: Temporal
evolution of the fraction of correct positions for distances d1 and d2 to the closest source. In both panels,
results are aggregated over all the sessions of the experiments.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153586.g004
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the shortest distance to the closest source and the number of correct answers at a given distance
di. For the two topologies and the experimental conditions, any player and any unknown posi-
tion is at maximum distance of two to the closest source. The ratio between the probabilities of
correct answers given at distance 1 and 2 from the sources indicates that proximity to source
provides an advantage (24.4% on the average) to get the correct color (Fig 4B).
The adaptation of the players across the first and the last game in each experimental session
is quantified by the averaged inter-proposal time. We observe similar values for the two experi-
ments, and although the average values are similar, the last automata game shows systemati-
cally a smaller average inter-proposal time (S2 Fig).
Transition events and probabilities
Given the sequence of proposals of one player and the color codes of the neighbors, we calcu-
late the transition probabilities between different colors. We consider that each position is
independent of each other, thus, we average the transition probabilities over all positions.
From all the possible transitions between colors, we compute the conditional probability to
change from any color to a given color X, P(X|nX) given nX neighbors in state X. This probabil-
ity, shown in Fig 5A, indicates that colors are practically equivalent for the players. This proba-
bility also points that, for a given position, as the number of neighbors with the same color nX
increases, the higher the probability that the player will switch to that color (or remain on it).
In addition, the probability to change to a different color PðXjX ; nXÞ and the probability to
remain in the same color P(X|X, nX) measure the inﬂuence of the neighborhood to either tran-
sitions between colors X X or to remain in the same color (transitions XX). As Fig 5B shows,
both the probability to change to color Xf and the probability to stick with color Xf increase
with the number of neighbors nXf having color Xf. The neighborhood provides stronger conﬁr-
mation of the current state of the individual than exerts pressure to change it. This is, given a
neighborhood conﬁguration with nXf, the probability for a player to stay in her current state
(being Xf) is greater than the probability of changing her state (being not Xf) to Xf. Interest-
ingly, the conviction of a player in her current state can be quantiﬁed by the value of P(X|X, 0)
 0.4, which matches PðX jX; nÞ for n = 3, corresponding to the neighborhood majority since
the degree of the interaction networks was set to k = 4.
Bayesian update
We assume players update their beliefs based on their previous belief and the information
observed from the neighborhood. Then, following Bayes theorem, the posterior belief of agent i
in state X = R, B, Y conditioned to receiving a signal A = R, B, Y is updated as follows,
PpostðXjAÞ ¼
PðAjXÞPpreðXjAÞX
xi¼R;B;Y
PðAjxiÞPpreðxijAÞ
: ð1Þ
By iterating Eq (1), the posterior belief of player i after receiving nR red, nB blue, and nY yel-
low signals is
PpostðXjAÞ ¼
PðRjXÞnRPðBjXÞnBPðY jXÞnY PpreðXjAÞX
xi¼R;B;Y
PðRjxiÞnRPðBjxiÞnBPðY jxiÞnY PpreðxijAÞ
: ð2Þ
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Fig 5. Transition Probabilities. (A) Probability P(X|nX) to change the unknown positions of the code from
any color (R, B or Y) to a given color X (R, B or Y) as a function of nX, this is, the number of nearest neighbors
already with color X. Results for each color are represented by the corresponding colored symbols. (B)
Probabilities P(Xf|Xi; nXf) for the unknown positions of the code as a function of nXf. Open and solid symbols
represent, for a given position, transitions between different colors (XX) and between the same color (XX)
respectively. Results for each color are represented by the corresponding colored symbols. Dashed lines
represent ﬁtting Eq (5) to the data (see Section Bayesian update for more details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153586.g005
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Note that
P
Ai¼R;B;Y
PpostðXjAiÞ ¼ 1. Now, assuming that P(A|X) = C0 for A = X and P(A|X) =
C0 for A 6¼ X, Eq (2) becomes
PpostðXjAÞ ¼
1
1þ
X
xi 6¼X
C0
C0
 nXnxi PpreðxijAÞ
PpreðXjAÞ
:
ð3Þ
The first hypothesis to consider is that the previous belief of the players, Ppre(xi|A), is not
related to the actual state of the player and it takes the same value for the different states X. In
this case, Eq (3) reduces to
PpostðXjAÞ ¼
1
1þ
X
xi 6¼X
snXnxi
: ð4Þ
with s = C0/C0.
We can estimate the value of the parameter s from the experimental data by computing the
root-mean-square error (RMSE) of the difference between the probabilities extracted from the
experimental data and the probabilities computed using Eq (4). The RMSE, shown in Fig 6A,
exhibits a minimum for s  1
2
indicating that the probability that the signal is of the same value
than the current state is twice the probability that the signal has a different value. This result is
in agreement with the experimental ﬁndings shown in Fig 5B.
We contemplate a second hypothesis where Ppre(xi|A) is not independent of the current
state, so, defining a ¼ PpreðxijAÞ
PpreðXjAÞ and s = C
0/C0, Eq (3) can be now written as
PpostðXjAÞ ¼
1
1þ a
X
xi 6¼X
snXnxi
; if A ¼ X:
1
1þ a1snXnA þ
X
xi 6¼ðX;AÞ
snXnxi
; if A 6¼ X:
8>>>><
>>>>:
ð5Þ
We can now estimate the parameters a and s by measuring the RMSE between the aggre-
gated probabilities extracted from the experimental data and the probabilities computed from
Eq (5). The RMSE exhibits a minimum for the parameters s = 0.57 and a = 0.19 (Fig 6B). The
parameter a takes into account non-social information only. For the same number of individu-
als choosing among the options (i.e., nx1 = nx2 = nx3), a = 1 corresponds to equal weight between
the options providing a probability of 1/3, as in a random choice. a< 1 implies a tendency to
remain in your current state since P(X|A = X) tends to 1 as a tends to zero, while for a> 1,
individuals tend to change their states more often. The parameter s contains the social influ-
ence. For s = 1, the players’ own opinion and the opinion of the neighborhood are balanced,
providing a probability of 1/2 (for a = 1). However, when s< 1 the opinion of the neighbor-
hood counts more than the players’ own opinion, while the opposite happens for s> 1.
Simulations
We have performed simulations confronting various models with the experimental data,
where agents change their state according to the experimentally determined transition prob-
abilities. We have also considered other models with different updating rules. In the Majority
rule, agents pick the color of the majority of their neighborhood and ties are broken by
Aggregation of Information in a Guessing Game
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Fig 6. Data fitting. (A) Root-mean-square error between the probabilities computed from experimental data (aggregated over all the experiments) and Eq
(4). Results for each color are represented by the corresponding colored lines. (B) Color-coded root-mean-square error between the probabilities computed
from experimental data (aggregated over all the colors across experiments) and Eq (5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153586.g006
Aggregation of Information in a Guessing Game
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0153586 April 19, 2016 10 / 15
random elections among the tied options. In the Voter model, agents pick a color at random
from the ones present in the neighborhood. In the Random model however, agents pick a
color at random not necessarily present in the neighborhood. The simulations mimic the
experimental conditions of the games by using the same number of agents, the same initial
conditions, and the same temporal sequence of updates. Fig 7 shows the time evolution of
the performance p(t) for the different models and the experimental data, in both cases aggre-
gated over games with the same interaction topology. In both networks, Majority rule out-
performed all other strategies, including the one used by humans. In the random network,
Voter performs at the end of the games as well as human strategies. In the regular network,
Voter performs slightly worse than Majority, and slightly better than human strategies. For
both networks, choosing a color at random independently of the neighbors’ proposals is the
worst strategy. Simulations also corroborate that, for the human strategy (Probabilities),
there are no differences in the performance of the different networks considered.
Discussion
We developed a web-based experiment in order to assess how different interaction topologies
affect the performance of the aggregation of information and to investigate the underlying
decision making process. We found that the behavior of the individuals was well captured by
Bayes theory of probability update. Bayesian inference has been observed in human sensorimo-
tor learning [29] and probabilistic cognition [30] as well as in the behavior of many animals
[31, 32] (and references therein). The derived expression for the probabilities allows for the
estimation of the parameters s and a, accounting for factors such as the external social influence
and the internal preference respectively. Different functional forms for these probabilities are
reported in the literature [3, 33–35] for different animals (including humans) and behavioral
situations. The parameter fitting to different experimental data shows a high variability in the
Fig 7. Confronting different models via simulations. Temporal evolution of p(t) for different simulation models in two types of interaction networks.
Probabilities correspond to simulations using the experimentally determined probabilities. Experimental data is represented by the black line and it is
aggregated over games with the same interaction topology. Simulations are averaged over 50 independent realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0153586.g007
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values of s (social influence) and a (internal preference), which suggests that they are not only
idiosyncratic but also task dependent.
We found that proximity to the source provides a significant advantage in getting the cor-
rect answer. The propagation of information can be seen as a wave front emanating from the
different sources. The positions shown initially are correctly assigned by the players and
almost do not change during the game. Thus, neighbors at distance d = 1 will receive this as a
constant signal compared to positions that are not known and consequently are changed
more often.
With respect to the effect on the aggregation of information of the different interaction
topologies considered, we found no significant difference on the performance of the game.
This result is in line with the behavior in the context of cooperation. In this case, players have
to choose between two options: cooperate or defeat, and they get a payoff according to a pay-
off matrix and the response of their neighbors. Recent large experiments show no difference
in the performance at the level of number of cooperators [20]. However, differences in the
performance depending on the network topology are reported in other works. For example,
in search problems, efficient networks can outperform inefficient networks [36] and the
opposite has also been reported [37, 38]. The reason for this contradictory result is already
discussed in reference [36], pointing out that the level of myopia during the search plays a
crucial role: in searches performed at intermediate levels, i.e. not too close nor too far, ineffi-
cient networks can outperform efficient ones. It also established that humans outperform
simulated strategies, pointing out that, for the search class of problems they have considered,
agent-based simulations are not sufficiently sophisticated to reflect human responses [37]. In
contrast, we found that simulations using agent-based models are useful to find a better per-
forming strategy that solves our problem. By confronting the experimental probabilities with
different numerical models based on different decision rules, we found that players did not
perform optimally, showing that the Majority rule outperformed players’ outcome for the
proposed task. A fundamental question that emerges from this result is why does individuals
use Bayesian inference despite the fact that it is not the optimal strategy? Our hypothesis is
that Bayesian inference explores and maintains the diversity of options for longer time com-
pared to the Majority rule that quickly narrows the set of final options. A test of this hypothe-
sis could be done in future experiments by decreasing the initial set of positions shown to the
players.
The adaptation is an important factor to be considered in games where participants are
made to play several times. In our experimental setup we specifically designed the first and the
last games to evaluate the adaptation of the players while minimizing the interference with the
subsequent games. Players were faster at the end of each experimental session corresponding
to a decrease in the inter-proposal times. However, in the games involving human players, we
found no differences in the performance of the players. Thus, players familiarized with the
game interface during the first game, and no further advantage was obtained from acquiring
more experience in the subsequent games.
In all the sessions, the participants approached the correct color code. Whether the games
lasted enough time to let the players reach consensus is an open question that needs to be
addressed in future experiments. Despite the results reported here, it would be interesting to
consider larger networks. We plan to conduct more experiments with larger groups in order to
address interaction networks with different neighborhood sizes as well as change the cognitive
load of the game by varying the number of positions initially shown and the length of the code.
It would also be interesting to study how people form consensus far from the correct solution
of the problem, that can be triggered by initializing incompatible targets.
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Supporting Information
S1 Text. Supporting text. Detailed description of the phases of the game, the instructions pro-
vided to the participants, and the automata game.
(PDF)
S1 Video. Activity of the players during one game. From top, the target color code is shown
on the first row, second row is left empty (white color) for visualization purposes, and in the
following rows the players proposals are displayed. Initially, only the three positions seen by
each player are displayed and as the players make their proposals the entire color codes appear.
(MP4)
S1 Fig. Temporal evolution of the p-value of two statistical tests. The unpaired Mann-Whit-
ney U test is represented by the black solid line and the paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test corre-
sponds to the red dashed line. At time steps of 1 s, we applied the tests between the
distributions of correct answers of the two interaction networks (aggregated over the different
games with the same interaction topology). The dotted-dashed line indicates the 5% signifi-
cance level.
(EPS)
S2 Fig. Inter-proposal time for the automata games in each experiment. The mean inter-
proposal time for the first (filled symbols) and last game (open symbols), both played against
automata, for each experiment. Bars represent the standard error.
(EPS)
S1 Data. Experimental data. Data collected during experimental sessions.
(ZIP)
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